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should also be looked at when weighing the impact such suit will have
on the state-federal balance.
The method employed by the Fourth Circuit in resolving the conflict
of the doctrine of immunity with § 1983 properly disposed of the clash
in terms of policy, and in so doing avoided the state-federal conflict by
reference to state law. Though it used labels commonly employed by
courts in questions of official immunity under § 1983, the court estab-
lished a guideline for other courts to follow without losing sight of the
real interests at stake. The Fourth Circuit has attempted to resolve the
conflict without frustrating the purpose of § 1983 or the public policies
behind the doctrine of immunity. While the decision is a refreshing
change from those in which the true purposes of § 1983 are ignored, the
Supreme Court in Pierson v. Ray may have nullified much of the thrust
of § 1983 in holding that it is to be read against the background of
common law torts."' It will require further ruling by the Court before the
true scope of the doctrine of immunity is known.
JOHN H. TISDALE
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
OF 1969 AND ITS APPLICATIONS TO FEDERALLY-
FUNDED HIGHWAYS
Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),
major federally-funded projects are to be scrutinized to insure that all
possible effects to the environment will be thoroughly evaluated before
approval of any major federal action.' Despite this legislative prescrip-
"See note 17 supra.
142 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970). The pertinent text is set out in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)
[hereinafter referred to as section 102(2)(C), as originally numbered in the act passed by
Congress] which provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possi-
ble: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall
be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth
in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
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tion, enforcement of the statute has been complicated by questions of
retroactive application.2 Because of the continuing nature of road devel-
opment, the problem of retroactive application has been particularly diffi-
cult to solve with regard to interstate highways which have reached var-
ious stages of completion as of the effective date of the statute. Several
tests have been utilized to determine if the statute was applicable to a
contested highway or highway segment, the most effective of which has
been the "balancing of factors" test formulated by the Fourth Circuit in
Arlington Coalition v. Volpe.
3
In Arlington Coalition, plaintiffs claimed that highway authorities, in
planning a highway through northern Virginia, had violated the provi-
sions of NEPA as well as other federal statutes. 4 As a remedy, plaintiffs
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action should
it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official
shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which
has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmen-
tal impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views
of appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to
develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to
the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as
provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal
through the existing agency review processes ....
2The question whether NEPA was to be applied to projects receiving federal approval
before January 1, 1970, the effective date of the act, has been termed a "volatile dispute in
the law." Environmental Law Fund v. Volpe, 340 F. Supp. 1328, 1331 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
For a discussion of the anticipated and actual retroactive effect of NEPA see generally
Note, Retroactive Application of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 22 HAST.
L.J. 805 (1971); Note, Retroactive Application of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 69 MICH. L. REV. 732 (1971); Note, Retroactive Application of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 39 TENN. L. REV. 735 (1972).
3458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1972).
The Fourth Circuit did not specifically designate its standard the "balancing of factors"
test, but its frequent use of the word "weighing" implied a balancing activity. The first use
of the term "balancing" is found in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d
1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where the court held that "NEPA mandates a rather finely
tuned and 'systematic' balancing analysis .... "
4Plaintiffs also alleged that highway officials had violated sections 128(a) and 138 of
1973]
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sought an injunction restraining the defendants from proceeding with any
further planning or construction of the challenged section of the highway
until such time as compliance with the requirements of NEPA had been
attained.' Defendants argued against the injunction on the ground that it
would be an improper retroactive application of NEPA because the high-
way was in progress prior to the effective date of the act.6 The Fourth
Circuit's decision to grant the injunction was based on a weighing of costs
and benefits, the elements that comprise the balancing test. Formulated
in April, 1972, the test has been consistently followed in subsequent cases,
with succeeding courts enumerating other factors that might be consid-
ered in applying the balancing test. The importance of the problem of
retroactivity, demonstrated by the considerable amount of litigation con-
cerning NEPA and highways, warrants a discussion of the development
of the "balancing of factors" test and the manner in which it has been
utilized.
Development of the Balancing of Factors Test
The declared policy of NEPA as expressed in section 102(2)(C) of the
act is to protect and preserve the national environment to the "fullest
extent possible."7 To effectuate this policy, Congress also directed in
section 102(2)(C) that all federal agencies prepare detailed statements
regarding the environmental impact of every major federal action recom-
mended for legislation or reviewed by the respective agencies.! The im-
the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 (23 U.S.C. §§ 128(a), 138 (1970)) and section 4(f) of
the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 (49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970)).
1458 F.2d at 1327.
'ld. at 1332.
7Note I supra.
8The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), an independent federal agency created
by NEPA to report directly to the President on the act's effectiveness, was assigned the task
of fostering agency procedures to attain the stated objectives. Exec. Order No. 11514, 3
C.F.R. 526 (1972), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970), directed the CEQ to circulate guidelines to
federal agencies for the preparation of impact statements in accordance with 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C) (1970). The final guidelines, issued on April 23, 1971, provided:
To the maximum extent practicable, the § 102(2)(C) procedures should be
applied to further federal actions having a significant effect on the environ-
ment, even though they arose from projects or programs initiated prior
to enactment of the act on January 1, 1970.
36 Fed. Reg. 7723 (1971).
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), an operating division of the Depart-
ment of Transportation, is the federal agency with the primary responsibility for developing
highways. Following the issuance of the interim CEQ guidelines (35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970)),
FHWA circulated proposed agency procedures which directed that "state highway depart-
ments should be requested to immediately begin implementation of the draft guidelines."
FHWA notice dated November 30, 1970, cited in Peterson & Kennan, The Federal-Aid
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pact statements are to insure that no action will be taken by the federal
government without full knowledge of the environmental consequences.
Notwithstanding the creditable purpose of the act, the imposition of
new statutory requirements upon partially constructed highways, or even
those that have been approved, poses a difficult problem. Although high-
way programs are conceived in the abstract as a traffic route between two
points, the actual work is done in segments9 which can vary in stages of
completion. The incremental segments then, are both independent actions
and integral portions of a transportation scheme; modification of the
location, design, or status of any individual project could cause revision
of the connecting segments and possibly even halt all highway work until
alteration of the one segment is made."0 Therefore, a suit brought to
enjoin the planning or construction of a highway project for failure to file
an environmental impact statement could affect the whole program even
if the evidence discovered in the study required an alteration or abandon-
ment of only a proposed segment.
While NEPA sets out in detail the procedures to be followed," neither
the language of the act nor the legislative history" speaks to the question
Highway Program: Administrative Procedures and Judicial Interpretation, 2
ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 50001, 50016 (1972).
For a discussion of the attempt by FHWA to postpone the effective date of NEPA
thirteen months see note 29 infra.
'Under the complex system of interstate highway development, in order to obtain
federal funding, state highway departments submit proposed highway programs to the
FHWA. If approved, the route is divided into segments for which further approval is
necessary as to specific location and design. The state undertakes all the work and expense
at each stage, and as each approval is obtained, federal money is thereby released to
reimburse the state for its proportional expenses incurred on behalf of the federal govern-
ment. This system fosters controlled highway development in accordance with federal stan-
dards. For a thorough discussion of the procedure of the federal-aid highway program see
Peterson & Kennan, The Federal-Aid Highway Program: Administrative Procedures and
Judicial Interpretation, 2 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 50001 (1972). See also City of Boston
v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 258-59 (lst Cir. 1972); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221,
224 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
"See Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Hwy. Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971) (construction on end segments of highway
enjoined while propriety of highway passing through federal parklands was decided).
"Note I supra.
"For the history of S. 1075, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, see S. REP.
No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The legislative history of the corresponding House
bill, H.R. 12549, is found at H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969). The Senate
bill was eventually passed although much of the text of the House bill was substituted for
the original language. During the congressional debate prior to passage of the statute, it
was frequently suggested by opponents of the bill that the act had no enforcement powers
and would be no more than an expression of congressional policy. See Hearings on S. 1075,
S. 237 and S. 1752 Before Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, 91st Cong., 1st
1973]
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of how to deal with federal projects in planning or construction stages as
of January 1, 1970, the effective date of the act. No specific statement in
the act evinces an intention by Congress to apply it retroactively to high-
ways that have received final design approval 3 prior to January, 1970.
Yet a broad reading of the statute indicates that the fullest environmental
consideration was to be immediately undertaken in all federal projects."
Prior to the formulation of the balancing test, no uniform technique
for resolving highway injunction suits existed." In cases arising soon after
the passage of NEPA, some courts, unsure of the scope of the act and
with little case law to rely on, interpreted the statute conservatively,
holding that NEPA was not broad enough to make significant changes
in approved highway programs. For example, in Pennsylvania Environ-
mental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, the district court held that although the
words of section 102(2)(C), requiring implementation of the provisions of
that section "to the fullest extent possible," exhibited an urgent tone, they
were also "flexible and pragmatic"; 7 it thus declined to recognize any
compulsory preparation of an impact statement. Another district court
felt that the act was nothing more than a "declaration of congressional
policy" and created no judicially enforceable rights or duties.
Yet, "to the fullest extent possible" had been interpreted as an ada-
Sess. (1969), cited in Reilly, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Federal
Highway Program: Merging Administrative Traffic, 20 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 21, 26-27
(1970).
"Final design approval" is a significant step in the systematic development of feder-
ally funded highways. Technically termed "PS&E approval" (plans, specifications, and
estimates), it is deemed to be a contractual obligation of the federal government for its
proportional contribution for the remainder of the work until completion, the only federal
participation remaining being final inspection. Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 101
et seq. (1970) at § 106(a). See also Peterson & Kennan, The Federal-Aid Highway Pro-
gram: Administrative Procedures and Judicial Interpretation, 2 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP.
50001, 50010 (1972).
"See note 2 supra.
sIn suits brought against state and federal highway officials for actions in violation of
section 102(2)(C), the standard remedy requested has been an injunction halting any further
activity in the planning or construction of a highway until such time as an environmental
impact statement is prepared and the proposed highway is reconsidered in the light of any
evidence contained in the statement. See, e.g., Brooks v. Volpe, 319 F. Supp. 90 (W.D.
Wash. 1970), rehearing denied, 329 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Wash. 1971), rev'd, 460 F.2d 1193
(9th Cir. 1972).
"1315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
1Id. at 248.
"Bucklein v. Volpe, 2 E.R.C. 1082, 1083 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1970) [E.R.C. refers to
the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. publication, ENVIRONMENT LAW-CASES]. Contra,
Pizitz v. Volpe, - F. Supp. , (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd, 467 F.2d 208 (5th Cir.
1972), noting that courts have entertained actions limited to ensuring compliance with the
procedural requirements of the act.
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mant directive by several courts hearing suits for non-compliance with
section 102(2)(C) in federal actions other than highways.'9 The import-
ance of environmental concern and compliance with the provisions of
NEPA was stressed in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic
Energy Commission,2" where the words "to the fullest extent possible"
were described by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals as
intolerant of discretionary application." The court differentiated between
the flexible substantive policy provisions of NEPA found in section 10122
and the highly inflexible procedural provisions of section 102 which esta-
blish a "strict standard of compliance."' By this differentiation, the
court made it clear that impact statements must be prepared whenever
possible; thereafter, any decision made on the basis of an environmental
study is discretionary with the appropriate federal agency, with due con-
sideration given to the policy expressed in section 101 of NEPA.
24
Instead of applying the conservative interpretation approach of
Bartlett, some courts have dealt with the problem of applicability of
NEPA to highways by use of a "critical date" test.21 In all such cases,
"See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States Army,
325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971), vacated, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972). Indeed,
as stated by one court, "[iut is hard to imagine a clearer or stronger mandate to the Courts."
Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. United States, I E.R.C. 1303, 1304 (W.D. Tex. Feb.
5,-1970), vacated as moot. 430 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970).
-449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
211d. at 1114.
"Section 101 of the original act is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970), the
pertinent section of which provides:
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on
the interrelations of all components of the natural environment, . . . de-
clares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to
use all practicable means and measures . . . in a manner calculated to
foster and promote to general welfare, to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill
the social, economic and other requirements of present and future genera-
tions of Americans.
2449 F.2d at 1112.
21ld. at 1113-14. Specifically criticizing the defendant's reliance on Pennsylvania Envi-
ronmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970), and Bucklein v.
Volpe, 2 E.R.C. 1082 (N.D. Cal. 1970), where it was held that there was neither compulsory
nor compelling need for impact statements, the court noted that those courts were discussing
the substantive and not the procedural duties imposed by NEPA. Id. at 1115 n.13. Because
a narrow reading of the statute curtailed the vigorous implementation of its provisions as
envisioned by its proponents, one commentator has suggested that by concluding that the
"fullest extent possible" language was indicative of a moderate, flexible, and pragmatic
approach, those courts have "clearly misconstrued the qualifying language of Section
102(2)(C)." Note, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 Saved from "Crabbed
Interpretation", 52 BosTON U.L. REv. 425, 442 n.101 (1972).
"Concerned Citizens of Marlboro v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1972); Harrisburg
1973]
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the courts have reasoned that the provisions of section 102(2)(C) were
required only if final design approval26 for the challenged project came
after January 1, 1970. The primary fault with this approach was that it
focused solely on the critical dates involved to the exclusion of what had
actually been accomplished on the highway. Decisions were often made
without reference to the stage of completion of the project, indicating that
the courts had paid little heed to the intent of CongressY The mandate
of NEPA was that all major federal actions, regardless of status, be
reviewed anew with a critical eye toward protection of the environment.
2
8
The simplistic critical date test inhibited the attainment of that goal.
29
A third analysis frequently used by the courts has resulted in the
refusal to apply NEPA if a highway is thought to be so developed that
reassessment of its design or location is impractical." This reasoning was
Coalition Against Ruining the Environment v. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa. 1971);
Elliot v. Volpe, 328 F. Supp. 831 (D. Mass. 1971). Accord, Wildlife Preserves, Inc. v. Volpe,
443 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1971), where the court held companion environmental statutes,
Federal-Aid Highway Act (23 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1970)) and Department of Transporta-
tion Act (49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970)), not applicable because the challenged projects had
received final design approval prior to the effective date of either act. But see Indian
Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972), where the court said:
There is much to be said for establishing a definite event after which an
E.I.S. [impact statement] is not required for projects already initi-
ated . ..
However, Congress did not do so and I do not believe such arbitrary action
is within congressional intent.
Id. at 1171.
"8The significance of final federal design approval is explained in note 13 and accompa-
nying text supra.
'See note 2 supra.
2'Note I supra.
2Another version of the critical date test was derived from the FHWA guidelines of
November 24, 1970 that exempted projects receiving design approval before February 1,
1971, thereby postponing the effective date of NEPA thirteen months. Universally, courts
have rejected this attempt to delay NEPA, sensing this delay in implementation to be
unnecessary. See Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc., 343 F. Supp. 761 (D. Vt. 1972), where
Judge Oakes rejected out of hand the claim of highway officials that no impact statement
was required if design approval came before February 1, 1971. Cf. Calvert Cliffs Coordinat-
ing Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). There, Judge Wright was confronted
with an AEC administrative rule that prohibited environmental issues from being raised in
hearings scheduled before March 4, 1971. Finding that this postponed the effectiveness of
NEPA for fourteen months, the judge found the time lag "shocking" in light of the import-
ance of environmental considerations during the agency review process. Id. at 119.
8See Ragland v. Mueller, 460 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1972), where it was held unreasona-
ble to believe that Congress intended for an environmental study to be made and the
highway possibly rerouted when sixteen miles of the twenty mile highway was completed.
Although decided one month after Arlington Coalition, no reference was made to the
balancing of factors test.
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employed by the district court in Civic Improvement Committee v.
Volpe,3 in holding that although other major federal actions had been
enjoined pending preparation of an impact statement,32 such action was
unnecessary since it was unlikely that the route would be changed even
with the benefit of an impact statement because previous work had
largely established the route of the highway.3 3 The implication derived
from the frequent use of this standard was that to order preparation of
an environmental study with concomitant reevaluation of a highway,
subjecting it to possible alteration or abandonment, could be an act in
disregard of the previous money and effort invested in the road. This
might constitute a retroactive application of NEPA not intended by Con-
gress.34
The results flowing from the standards employed in Civic Improve-
ment Committee and Bartlett, like the results derived from the use of the
critical date test, frustrated the liberal application of NEPA envisioned
by the proponents of the act.3 5 Consequently, one year after the passage
of NEPA, effective enforcement of the statute as regards federal high-
ways had not yet been achieved. No single test theretofore employed was
broad enough to encompass all of the factors involved in a suit for non-
compliance with the provisions of section 102(2)(C). It appeared that
proper implementation of the impact statement requirements could only
be realized through a comprehensive, uniform standard. Such a standard
is the "balancing of factors" test as set out in Arlington Coalition v.
Volpe.
36
The Fourth Circuit, in Arlington Coalition, felt that in spite of the reasons expressed
in cases refusing to impose the requirements of section 102(2)(C), the determining factor
seemed to be the stage of construction of the project. 458 F.2d at 1331.
314 E.R.C. 1160 (W.D.N.C. March 24, 1972), affd, 459 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1972).
"3The court cited Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.
1972) (action to enjoin construction of a dam and reservoir projects), and Named Individual
Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Hwy. Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th
Cir. 1971) (action to halt highway through parkland).
"The court noted that location of the road had been administratively established,
construction contracts had been let, earth moving had begun, and there was little chance
that a more practical route would be found. 4 E.R.C. 1162.
34Note 30 supra. Cf. Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1038,
1039 (D. Ore. 1970).
"The CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 1075, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT,
115 CONG. REC. 39702 (1969), stated:
Rather, the language in Section 102 is intended to assure that all agencies
of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives set out in said
section 'to the fullest extent possible' under their statutory authorizations
and that no agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construction of its
existing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance.
Id. at 39703.
"Note 3 supra. In Calvert Cliffs, the court was establishing a guide for federal agencies
1973]
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Arlington Coalition was a suit initiated by persons who owned prop-
erty or resided in the path of a segment of proposed interstate highway
1-66.7 In the district court, the plaintiffs' suit to enjoin defendants'
planning and construction activities was denied s.3 The Fourth Circuit, in
reversing the district court, held that compliance with NEPA was manda-
tory for any highway
until it had reached that stage of progress where the costs of
altering or abandoning the project could so definitely outweigh
whatever benefits that might accrue therefrom that it might no




Inquiring into the stage of development that 1-66 had reached, the court
found that almost all necessary property in the proposed corridor route
had been acquired" and that a large amount of relocation of residents and
businesses had been accomplished. 1 However, final engineering plans,
specifications, and estimates had not been approved and very little con-
struction had begun. Having weighed all the relevant facts, the court
concluded that 1-66 had not yet reached the point where the costs of
suspension or modification of the project would certainly outweigh the
as to how to determine whether to alter or abandon a challenged highway after an impact
statement had been prepared. It recommended that the "balancing analysis" include both
the "environmental amenities" and the "economic and technical considerations." 449 F.2d
at 1113. The Fourth Circuit, with no acknowledgement of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals, apparently adopted this test, with refinements, to indicate when the
requirements of NEPA should be imposed on an ongoing highway project.
3 The highway was to originate at a point approximately seventy-five miles west of
Washington, D.C., and was to extend through Arlington County, Virginia, that portion
being the contested section of the highway. There it was anticipated that 1-66 would connect
with another proposed highway, both crossing the Potomac River into the District of
Columbia at a planned bridge site. For a discussion of the public debate and litigation
concerning the proposed Three Sisters Bridge see D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459
F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971) and D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 434 F.2d 436 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
38332 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Va. 1971). Among the bases for Judge Lewis's decision were
the following: (1) several cases had held that NEPA was particularly not applicable to
highways initiated before January 1, 1970; (2) FHWA interim instructions dictated that
compliance with NEPA was not required of projects initiated before February 1, 1971; (3)
an impact statement was being prepared; and (4) a private consultant had been engaged to
advise the state on how to lessen the noise pollution problem.
11458 F.2d at 1331.
"At the time of the trial, 93.9% of all dwellings and 98.5% of all business structures
had been acquired. Id. at 1328.
'1At the time of the trial, 75.6% of all families and 84.6% of all businesses had been
relocated. Id.
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benefit that might accrue to the general public through safeguarding the
environment by means of impact statements."
The uniqueness of the test is the manner in which it operates: within
the phrasing of the standard, one can see how the court allocated weight
to each element to be considered. Primarily, the test takes into account
the congressional attitude toward strict enforcement of the statute,43 for
the use in the test of the words "clearly" or "definitely" indicate that it
is weighted in favor of environmental interests. Phrased in this manner,
the test creates a presumption in favor of applicability of NEPA, thus
requiring highway officials to justify their failure to file an impact state-
ment. To overcome this presumption, officials must present substantial
proof that little or no environmental damage will be caused by a chal-
lenged highway. In the alternative, authorities must provide convincing
evidence that it is too late to modify feasibly the proposed route.44
Additionally, the balancing of factors test was constructed to take into
consideration the problem of retroactive application of the statute. In its
opinion, the Fourth Circuit stated that there would be no retroactivity
simply because an action was approved for funding before the effective
date of the statute,45 thereby disposing of the critical date approach.
However, the court recognized that some federal actions, having reached
a certain stage of progress, could not be amended even by the urgent
imperatives of NEPA.46 That recognition is implicit in the balancing test;
through use of the cost-benefit analysis, retroactivity is taken into ac-
count and is determined as that which lies beyond the point where costs
of halting the project outweigh benefits to the public.
'2Id. at 1329-30.
"3The Fourth Circuit was certain of Congress's intention to apply NEPA strictly when
it held that
if there is a reasonable possibility that a mistake had been made in the
planning of a project as expensive, disruptive, and permanent as a high-
way, and if that project can still be altered or abandoned, the project must
be held in abeyance pending determination of whether a mistake in fact
has been made.
458 F.2d at 1338.
"The Fourth Circuit believed that the evidence must be persuasive; any doubt that the
critical stage has been reached when reconsideration of the projct is nearly impossible must
be resolved in favor of applicability. 458 F.2d at 1331.
"5The critical date approach had previously been weakened by the decision in
Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ga. 1971). There the Fifth
Circuit agreed with the idea of setting an administrative approval date (such as final federal
design approval) as the point of "major federal action" for purposes of application of
NEPA. However, the court also held that compliance with section 102(2)(C) was required
on all federal projects on which substantial actions were yet to be taken "regardless of the
date of 'critical' federal approval of the project." Id. at 144.
11458 F.2d at 1331.
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Thus, in Arlington Coalition, a standard was formulated based on the
Fourth Circuit's view of both the congressionally established priorities
and the reality that some projects are too fixed to be changed. Applied
to a contested highway project, the test insures the complete considera-
tion of all pertinent facts and provides a means of measuring the costs
and benefits of compliance with the impact statement requirements of
NEPA.
Subsequent Application of the Balancing of Factors Test
Conceptually, the balancing of factors test is a hollow formula be-
cause the Fourth Circuit gave few suggestions as to what should be con-
sidered "costs" and "benefits" for use in the test.47 Specifically, the court
noted that final federal design approval had not been given, construction
contracts had not been awarded, and actual construction on the highway
had not yet begun.1s In stating that the court could not define for all cases
the point of completion beyond which section 102(2)(C) was no longer
applicable,49 the Fourth Circuit was saying that it could not prescribe all
of the factors that should be considered in determining whether to apply
NEPA. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit indicated that decisions were to be
made on a case-to-case basis, each judged by a weighing of all of the
pertinent factors. The question then arises of what other factors are to
be employed in the weighing analysis. Subsequent courts applying the
balancing test have studied a wide range of factors. A discussion of these
will indicate how definition has been given to the terms "costs" and
"benefits" by way of later courts identifying facts that warrant review
when applying the balancing test.
In suits challenging highways for non-compliance with section
102(2)(C), previous related highway development must be one of the
factors to be considered. Because extension increments are simply contin-
uances of previously constructed highways, their degree of dependence on
the existing segments restricts the extent to which an addition can be
altered. Although completed segments obviously cannot be changed, the
general rule of applicability of NEPA to extension segments should be
the one expressed in the Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines:
"Where it is not practical to reassess the basic action, it is still important
that future incremental major actions be shaped so as to minimize ad-
4 The broadness and flexibility of the balancing test did not escape criticism. In Ward
v. Ackroyd, 344 F. Supp. 1202, 1225 n.71 (D. Md. 1972), Judge Miller termed the test
"vague, subjective and extremely difficult to apply ....
11458 F.2d at 1332.
4DId.
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verse environmental consequences." 50 To require more than this would
raise even further a question of retroactive application of the statute; to
do less would be contrary to the spirit of NEPA.
The modification of an extension segment is also restricted by the
work completed on projects within that segment itself.5 ' Therefore, any
court hearing an injunction suit must take into consideration the "status
of the work" on a segment in applying the balancing test. This factor is
so broad that it is actually a category encompassing specific considera-
tions that certain courts have noted in highway cases. In Arlington Coali-
tion, the Fourth Circuit noted that federal agency officials might take into
account previous investment in the proposed route in reconsidering a
challenged highway project.52 The court thereby implied that investment
was to be a factor of consideration for a trial court as well when applying
the balancing test.53 Some of the expense-related items that courts have
looked at that relate to the degree of completion of a segment are the
number of bids advertised and contracts awarded, 54 the amount of right-
of-way obtained and relocation accomplished, 55 the possible escalation of
costs to the program through inflation during the delay period,56 the
public safety, 7 and the amount of unemployment due to delay in con-
035 Fed. Reg. 7391 (1970). This instruction appears to have been interpreted to sanc-
tion the abandonment of a highway project if an impact statement so indicates. In Comm.
to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 734 (D. Conn. 1972), it was implied that an
extension increment could be abandoned if what had been worked on before had indepen-
dent utility.
5 1Under the often misleading nomenclature of interstate highway development, a "pro-
ject" may be both an incremental length or section of a highway program, or it may be a
unit of work within a section such as surveying or paving. To avoid confusion in this article,
the term "segment" was used in note 9 and accompanying text to mean a project in the
extension or length sense. "Project", as used in the text accompanying this footnote, and
only here, is meant to be items of work within a section of highway.
5458 F.2d at 1333.
nInvestment may be defined in terms of either money or time, but as a factor for
consideration in the balancing test it contributes to the cut-off point for the imposition of
the provisions of section 102(2)(C). Accord, Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v. Volpe, 334
F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 4 E.R.C. 1684 (D. Hawaii Oct.
18, 1972).
"1Civic Improvement Comm. v. Volpe, 4 E.R.C. 1160, 1162 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 24, 1972),
affd, 459 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1972); see also Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v. Volpe, 334
F. Supp. 132, 145 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
5Keith v. Volpe, 4 E.R.C. 1350 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 1972); Lathan v. Volpe, 4 E.R.C.
1487 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 4, 1972), 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1972).
5 Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D. Conn. 1972) (the
court refused to consider defendants' claim of increased costs because that assumed that
the highway was to be built and such a decision could not be made until after preparation
of an impact statement).
57Keith v. Volpe, 4 E.R.C. 1350, 1368 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 1972), motion to amend
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struction. 8 The frequency with which the degree of completion of projects
comprising a segment has been a subject of consideration indicates that
it, particularly when considered in conjunction with prior highway devel-
opment, may be the most controlling factor in determining whether to
apply NEPA.
Any balancing of factors should include the likelihood of harm to the
environment if the project is constructed as planned. Such consideration
is necessary whether the damage is ascertainable or unknown. In the
former case, under certain circumstances, it may appear that the route
cannot or will not be changed.59 Accordingly, it might be argued that
there is no compelling need for an impact statement. A decision based
on this reasoning, however, is an unauthorized administrative judgment
by a court which approves further development of a road. Unless the
highway is so inalterably fixed, the wiser course of action would be to
enjoin all development activities until the preparation of an impact state-
ment to insure that no alternate route does exist" and that there will be
no further significant environmental damage." When the harm is un-
known, the situation is exactly that for which an impact statement was
intended to provide guidance. Ecological relationships are subtle and can
often be detected only by close study, the detrimental effects of highway
construction not always being evident. 2 For that reason, impact state-
ments should be required in all cases unless it is obvious that no environ-
mental damage will occur.63
judgment denied, 4 E.R.C. 1562 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1972) (concern over exposed utility
lines and vacant structures); Brooks v. Volpe, 4 E.R.C. 1532, 1534 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 30,
1972) (danger of detour during winter months taken into account in forming injunction).
58Brooks v. Volpe, 4 E.R.C. 1492 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 4, 1972), rehearing, 4 E.R.C.
1532, 1533-4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 1972).
"Brooks v. Volpe, 4 E.R.C. 1492 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 4, 1972), rehearing, 4 E.R.C.
1532, 1535 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 1972) (most scarring of the landscape had occurred by
the time of suit so little could be protected by injunction); Civic Improvement Comm. v.
Volpe, 4 E.R.C. 1160, 1162 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 24, 1972), affd, 4 E.R.C. 1163 (4th Cir. May
15, 1972) (little chance that route or elevation of road would be changed by impact state-
ment); Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238, 241 (M.D. Pa.
1970) (most feasible route was to encroach on a trout stream bed).
'0Keith v. Volpe, 4 E.R.C. 1350 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 1972).
"Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761 (D. Vt. 1972).
21d. The highway was originally planned to extend through marshlands but was re-
routed when highway officials were appraised of the unique biological value of the area.
Due to the absence of an impact statement, such value may have been overlooked if not
for the efforts of concerned citizens.
6Ward v. Ackroyd, 344 F. Supp. 1202, 1226 (D. Md. 1972), holding that although
highway officials had taken into consideration all conceivable effects of road construction,
further highway development must be enjoined pending public hearings that might provide
additional information.
